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Abstract
We propose a stylized model of production and exchange in which long-term
investors set their production decision over a horizon τ , the “time to pro-
duce”, and are liquidity constrained, while financial investors trade over a
much shorter horizon δ ( τ) and are therefore more duly informed on the
exogenous shocks affecting the production output. The equilibrium solu-
tion proves that: (i) long-term producers modify their production decisions
to anticipate the impact of short-term investors allocations on prices; (ii)
short-term investments return a positive expected profit commensurate to
the informational advantage. While the presence of financial investors im-
proves the efficiency of risk allocation in the short-term and reduces price
volatility, the model shows that the aggregate effect of commodity market
financialization results in rising the volatility of both farms’ default risk and
production output.
1. Introduction
The integration of agricultural commodity and financial markets has been
largely criticized by both a growing body of economic literature (see e.g. [1])
and political consideration [2]. According to those critics the overflow of
capital invested in the commodity markets feeds a destabilizing speculation,
and a tightening of market regulation is then claimed. While the empirical
evidence of international food price spikes and volatility driven by financial
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markets is robust (see [3] and references therein), its mechanisms and poten-
tial drawbacks for production risk management are unexplored.
This paper analyzes the effects of market integration on conventional
production planning and farm liquidity risk management policies within a
stylized equilibrium model of production, trade and consumption of an agri-
cultural commodity where financial and agricultural commodity markets are
partially integrated. We suggest that the “time to produce” is the fundamen-
tal parameter governing risk allocation and production dynamics and should
be considered in designing more efficient production schemes and distribution
policies aimed at improving liquidity risk-sharing.
The stylized model assumes that the production of an agricultural com-
modity is risky because farmers’ resources allocation and production decisions
are irreversible and taken over a horizon τ , the “time to produce”. On the
other hand financial investors trade over a much shorter horizon δ ( τ) and
possess an information advantage contingent on the exogenous shocks affect-
ing production of the commodity. In our model, investments on contingent
contracts play a role similar to investments on physical storage and the zero
net supply condition is assumed to hold on average.
Actually, as discussed by [4], any hedging policy, by requiring margin
capital and liquidity, will in general have adverse effects on liquidity needs.
In particular the inefficiency of long-term industry’s risk management are
documented and discussed in [5], in [6], [7] and in [8].
Motivated by the above remarks, in the model at hand it is assumed that
long-term investors face a liquidity constraint: at the end of the production
cycle the farm goes bankrupt and its production is lost if the profit resulting
from selling the production at market price is not sufficient to break even.
Consequently, while price levels continue to depend on the joint allocation
decisions of financial investors and producers, profits from financial hedging
cannot be used to soften the liquidity constraint faced by long-term investors.
In practice this constraint reproduces a segmentation of the capital market
which is empirically well documented: most of the profits in commodity mar-
ket trading remunerate professional investors while farm hedging investments
are low.
In the model the commodity equilibrium price is thus set by the clearing
of the market in an economy populated by an heterogeneous set of producers
exposed to idiosyncratic and systematic shock components, by consumers
described by an exogenously specified demand curve and by an extra demand
or supply contribution generated by financial agents.
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A comparative statics exercise proves that this model can reproduce many
interesting stylized facts. First of all it is possible to prove that the long-
term investors modify the production choice due to the effects of financial
trading. In addition the financial investors make profit by exploiting their
informational advantage. Finally, the model shows a progressive increase in
the volatility of the produced quantity and a growth in default risk with an
increasing market integration.
Our model highlights that the major issue in farm risk management is
the necessity to alleviate the effects of credit constraints to reduce price pres-
sure on producers and consumers. Correspondingly, public subsidization of
agricultural investments can be interpreted as a necessary (possibly ineffi-
cient) response to restore the balance of capital flows from short-term to
long-term investors. A rationalization for the farm policy actions similar to
our has been discussed also in [9]. Our approach, however, is more focused
on the description of farmers’ production planning decisions and our findings
indicate that a rational production planning and liquidity risk management
must classify different productions and financing opportunities considering
the “time to produce” constraint faced by different participants.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we define the model and
discuss its innovations with respect to the past literature. In Section 3 we
present and discuss numerical results and their dependence on exogenous
parameters. Section 4 is devoted to a discussion about the assumptions made
within the model, while Section 5 to conclusions. A simplified (analytical
solvable) version of the model is provided in the Appendix, together with
some techinical aspects of the self consistent calculation procedure adopted.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Related literature
The model at hand is based on many simplifying assumptions in common
with other rational expectations competitive storage models, [10], [11], [12,
13] and [14].
The intrinsic information asymmetry introduced in the model (discussed
in Section 2.2) can be seen as a reduced form of the long-standing hedging
pressure theory of commodity prices that dates back to [15], [16] and, more
recently, to [17].
Market efficiency and its implications on commodity futures prices dy-
namics dates back to the seminal contribution of [18]. In presence of perfect
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(infinitely liquid and frictionless) capital markets, farmers could borrow suf-
ficient capital to invest in the production and simultaneously take a position
in the contingent contract markets to hedge the production risk.
The relation between liquidity constraints and productivity in farming
and agricultural industries is grounded on a vast literature, see e.g. [19] and
references therein. The influence of biological production lags on agricultural
commodity price dynamics has been investigated in literature by means of
the well known cobweb model, for example in the case of U.S. beef markets
(see [20]). A thorough analysis of the relation between credit and liquidity
constraints, farm investment policies and optimal subsidization policies could
be found in [21].
In the equilibrium analysis described in [22] it is shown that the presence
of producers’ liquidity constraints induces mean reversion in futures prices,
while government price subsidies, if actively hedged by producers, lowers fu-
tures risk premia and reduces price volatility. Differently from that approach,
here we explicitly model a multiplicity of producers which can default due
to price dynamics. In this way we can analyze the equilibrium relations be-
tween liquidity restrictions, producers’ default and commodity prices. In this
respect, our model bears some similarities with the model discussed in [23]
where limits to arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers.
2.2. The model
Production, trade and consumption of a real good are explicitly modeled.
The price is set by the equilibrium between the supply and demand when
the market clears. In particular, the equilibrium price is determined by the
agents’ interaction, their operational timeline and market clearing conditions.
Hereafter agents are idealized to the extent that farmers can only produce
real goods and financial investors can only trade goods whose payoff is con-
tingent to the production outcome of the real one. The two types of agents
are considered separated from one another in order to study the correspond-
ing sector’s returns. However, a real agent could behave as a combination of
the two idealized ones. As will be commented below considering a real agent
(for example a farmer that can both produce and trade) does not alter the
results of the model.
2.2.1. Agents
Supply and demand are regulated by the interaction of three types of
agents: farmers, consumers and financial investors.
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• Farmers are the producers of the commodity goods in the economy.
We consider an ensemble of N farmers, all producing the same food
commodity, which only are allowed to sell the produced goods. A
single farmer produces a quantity q of this commodity investing an
amount of capital m. We consider that each farmer incurs in a fixed
cost which do not depend on the quantity produced. For the sake of
simplicity we assume cF to be the same for all the farmers.
The operational decision of the quantity to be produced is taken by
the farmer at time 0. The quantity q will be available on the market
at a later time τ , corresponding to the “time to produce”, and sold at
a price pτ . Thus, the profit of a farmer will be:
piF = pτqτ −m− cF (1)
Producers are assumed to be risk neutral and, for the sake of simplicity,
a zero rate discounting is applied. Extensions of the model to both fixed
cost farmers’ dependency and to finite rate discounting are straightfor-
ward and will be discussed elsewhere. Within our framework the effect
of individual risk aversion would be mitigated by the existence of a
multitude of heterogeneous producers.
If the actual profit reaped by the farmer is negative the farmer defaults
and the amount produced is distributed among lenders and does not
contribute to the total quantity of goods brought to the market at time
τ . Notice that in our model the liquidity constraint, that, as we will see
is crucial in determining the production output volatility, is introduced
by modeling the farmers’ default. The quantity qτ is determined by the
investment level m, via a production function qτ (m), that is generically
assumed to be concave and with a positive derivative. We choose a
simple form of qτ (m):
qτ (m) = θτ
√
m (2)
where θτ is the “fitness” which induces uncertainty in the final amount
specific to each farmer. θ models the exogenous stochastic uncertainty
shocks and its realization at time τ is not predictable by farmers at the
time of the production operational decision. However, its probability
distribution (described in Section 2.2.2) is assumed to be known.
The time interval τ represents the lag between the farmers’ operational
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investment and the market clearing epoch (in short, the “time to pro-
duce”).
All the farmers enter the market at time t = 0 in exactly the same
conditions θ = θ0. Each farmer sets an investment level m at time
t = 0, maximizing the expected profit E0[piF ]:
E0[piF ] = γ
√
m−m− cF (3)
where γ is the expected value of the price and the market fitness at the
time τ conditional to the available information at time 0:
γ = E0 [pτθτ ] (4)
The effective selling price pτ is set by market equilibrium, while the
variation of market fitness θτ is determined by stochastic fitness. The
investment level m will be set consistently with market clearing by
maximizing the expected profit given in Eq. (3) with respect to m:
m =
(γ
2
)2
(5)
Those quantities will determine the farmer’s effective profit.
• Consumers. We model the aggregate demand for food as given by:
D =
w
(pτ )
β
(6)
where β is the demand elasticity. The demand curve indicates the
quantity of the commodity which all consumers taken together would
be willing to buy at each level of price. In the model, the value of w is
a constant parameter.
• Financial Investors are defined as agents that neither produce nor
consume goods, entering the market at time τ−δ very close to the mar-
ket clearing (δ  τ). They are informed of the fitness θτ (∼ θτ−δ) and
are allowed to trade on future contracts written on the produced good
itself and contingent to the realization of θτ . While several investment
strategies are in principle possible, we assume that the investor trade
contingent goods in a quantity that depends linearly on the differential
of the newly available information θ0 − θτ :
QS (θτ ) = α (θ0 − θτ ) (7)
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where α measures the degree of integration between the financial and
the commodity market. Importantly, we will show that its value can be
determined self consistently if one assumes that the investment level is
chosen in such a way that the average investment return is maximum.
In case of frictionless infinitely liquid capital markets and synchronous
decisions, QS can be vanishing either because α tends to zero (no mar-
ket integration) or τ tends to zero (synchronous agents’ decisions, im-
plying no information asymmetry). We will show that, when informa-
tion asymmetry and market integration are present, the net demand
QS of financial investors is zero on average. Consistently with this con-
dition, we consider the expected capital gain of the financial investor
as:
Eτ−δ[piS] = Eτ−δ[QS pτ ]− cS ' α (θ0 − θτ ) pτ − cS (8)
where cS is the average financial transaction cost, pτ is set by the market
equilibrium and piS = α (θ0 − θτ ) pτ − cS. Consistently with the case of
the farmer, in Eq. (8) we do not consider the cost of capital. However,
since δ  τ capital investments are more expensive for farmers than
for financial investors. For this reason, considering the cost of capital in
agents’ profits will eventually increase the profit of financial investors,
with respect to that of producers.
2.2.2. The probabilistic description of fitness uncertainty
Even if all the farmers enter the market with the same fitness θ0, their
fitness will be different at time τ due to unpredictable changes in the global
production condition of the commodity, affecting independently each indi-
vidual farmer. Denoting by θiτ the fitness at time τ of farmer i, we write it
as the sum of normal distributed aggregate and idiosyncratic innovations:
θiτ = θ0 + σ¯Wτ + σW
i
τ (9)
where Wτ and W
i
τ , i = 1, . . . , N are N + 1 statistically independent Wiener
processes, with N denoting the number of farmers. σ¯ and σ are positive
parameters that determine the typical size of the variation in the average
fitness and the difference between this average and the fitness of a single
farmer.
Hereafter, we will assume that the number of farmers is very large, and
denote by EI [φ(θiτ )] the average value between all the farmers of a function
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φ of θiτ :
EI
[
φ(θiτ )
]
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
φ(θiτ ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dxφ(x)Nx(θτ , σ
2τ) (10)
where θτ = θ0 + σ¯Wτ and Nx(a, b) is a normal distribution of average a and
variance b.
We will also denote by EA[ξ(θτ )] the average value of a function ξ of θτ
over the realizations of Wτ :
EA[ξ(θτ )] =
∫ ∞
−∞
dxξ(x)Nx(θ0, σ¯
2τ) (11)
2.2.3. The time line
• At time 0, the farmers decide the amount of capital to invest in the
production. In order to take this decision, they can access all the
information on the past time course of θ and of the price. Based on
this information, they know exactly the probability distribution of the
fitness at time τ . Moreover, they know the equations regulating the
commodity market they participate in and anticipate their investment
decision conditional on the realization of the fitness.
• At time τ − δ, δ  τ , the approximate value θτ of the aggregate fitness
is observed by financial investors who set their strategy according to
Eq. (7).
• At time τ the market for the food commodity clears and the equilibrium
price pτ is determined, production of non defaulted farmers is allocated
to consumers and profits are distributed to farmers. For α 6= 0, due
to commodity and financial market integration, financial investors with
long (short) positions maturing at τ also contribute to an extra demand
(supply).
Farmers’ production decision. The quantity Qτ brought to the market
at time τ is conditional on the production decision taken at time 0 and on
the realization of the fitness (aggregate plus idiosyncratic). From Eq. (5)
and (2), we have
Qτ =
√
m
∑
i
′
θiτ =
(
γ
2
∑
i
′
θiτ
)
(12)
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where the primed sum runs over the farmers who are able to make a positive
profit (namely, that do not default). Assuming the number of farmers is very
large, we have:
Qτ (θτ ) =
γ
2
EI
[
θiτχ(θ∗,∞)
(
θiτ
)]
(13)
where χ(a,b) is the characteristic function of the interval (a, b) and θ
∗ is defined
as the minimum value of θ corresponding to a non negative profit for the
farmers, i.e. θ∗ = max
[
0, 1
pτ
(
γ
2
+ cF
2
γ
)]
. The value of γ entering in θ∗ is
estimated by Eq. (4) as:
γ = EA[pτ (θτ ) θτ ] (14)
where pτ is a function of θτ determined by the marked clearing (see below)
and we have assumed, under rational expectation, that E0[θτ ] = E
A[θτ ].
The farmers’ total return is computed in a static form as a statistical
average over the farmers and over different realizations of the fitness. The
average farmers’ total return, also determined by market clearing prices,
is evaluated considering the average profit ΠF per unit of invested capital
MF = m+ cF :
µF =
ΠF
MF
=
ΠF(
γ
2
)2
+ cF
. (15)
where m has been estimated using Eq. (5). The expected farmers’ profit ΠF
is estimated as:
ΠF = E
A
[
EI
[
piF (θ
i
τ )
]]
(16)
where, putting together Eqs. (1), (2) and (5), piF (θ
i
τ ) =
γ
2
pτθ
i
τ − γ
2
4
− cF if
θiτ > θ
∗ and piF (θiτ ) = −γ
2
4
− cF otherwise.
Similarly, the expected fraction of defaulting farmers at time τ is given
by:
f = 1− EA [EI [χ(θ∗,∞) (θiτ)]] (17)
Financial investors’ allocation decision. In this model the quantity
of contingent goods, given in Eq. (7), is decided by the financial investor at
time τ − δ, under the condition of zero average net supply. This condition
is automatically verified, since EA[QS] = αE
A[θτ − θ0] = 0. In fact on a
single trade the investor can reduce or increase the amount of production
available for consumption, but this deviation has zero expectation under
the farmer information set. Following the same reasoning used to compute
the farmer total return, we interpret this static condition as a weak form
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of the dynamic constraint that financial investors are zero net suppliers of
the traded commodity. Notice that by construction the position held by the
financial investor in the long run will play a role similar to virtual storage with
zero contents in average, with the possibility of both negative and positive
inventory fluctuations.
The financial investor may produce a capital gain piS(θτ ), given in the
last term of Eq. (8), by extracting the informational rent generated by the
possibility to select an optimal strategy based on the observation of the
realized level of fitness. Since the feasible strategies are market neutral, i.e.
on average the capital invested in the long and short position adds up to
zero, the investment return per unit of dollar long is quantified by:
µS =
ΠS
MS
(18)
where ΠS is determined by the average capital gain accumulated by the
investor over different outcomes of the fitness θτ :
ΠS = E
A [piS (θτ )] (19)
and, abstracting from margin requirements to short sell the commodity, MS
is the expected amount of capital required for the investment in the long
positions:
MS = E
A
[
(QS(θτ )pτ + cS) χ(−∞,θ0)(θτ )
]
(20)
where QS(θτ ) is given by Eq. (7) and cS is the average trading transaction
cost.
2.2.4. Commodity Market clearing
The selling price pτ and the allocation of resources among agents are
determined by the clearing of the market, namely by the total supply equaling
the total demand, conditioned to the realization of the fitness uncertainty θτ .
For α 6= 0, in case of an adverse (favorable) realization, θτ < θ0 (θτ > θ0),
the production supply (consumer demand) is augmented by the extra supply
(demand) generated by the financial agents investing on contingent goods
maturing at τ .
w
(pτ )
β
= Qτ (θτ ) +QS(θτ ) (21)
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where Qτ is the quantity of goods produced at time τ by farmers that have
not defaulted and is given by Eq. (13), and QS is the extra financial investors’
demand or supply defined in Eq. (7). This equation must be solved iteratively
together with Eq. (14), since in this equation the selling price pτ as a function
of θτ enters explicitly. The existence of a unique solution for the equilibrium
price and the procedure for solving numerically Eq. (21) together with (13)
is discussed in the Appendix.
3. Calculation
The equilibrium of the model is characterized by solving the market clear-
ing in Eq. (21). In this manner the consumer prices pτ , the equilibrium
production Qτ (given in Eq. (13)) and the returns on investments µS and
µF (defined in Eqs. (18,15)), as well as other derivative quantities, can be
determined for different values of market integration α.
The model’s solution depends on the determination of the farmers’ ex-
pectation γ (given in Eq. (14)), which is calculated using the price schedule
pτ as obtained by solving Eq. (21). The system of Eq. (14) and Eq. (21)
cannot be solved analitically due to the presence of the liquidity constraint
present in the lower extreme of the definite integral appearing in Eq. (17).
The system is then solved through the numerical self-consistent iterative pro-
cedure is described in the Appendix. Numerical results will of course depend
on the choice of the scenario parameters, in particular β, fixing the market
elasticity, and σ¯ determining fitness volatility. Thus, a comparative statics
of an analytic approximation of the model for the case of a single farmer
has been used to facilitate the setting of the parameters’ values used in the
complete model simulation. The analytic approximation of the model is also
given in the Appendix.
The equilibrium solution discussed below has been found for the param-
eter set listed in Table 1. In the following we also discuss the robustness of
the results for different choices of the scenario parameters.
4. Results and economic implications
4.1. Equilibrium prices
Figure 1 shows the price function pτ (θ) solving Eq. (21), for the choice of
the scenario parameters given in Table 1, as a function of the difference θτ−θ0,
for α = 0 (representing the scenario with no markets integration) and for a
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finite value of α. As expected financial trading has the effect of stabilizing the
equilibrium price by smoothing the price dependence on exogenous shocks.
Consistently with traditional perfect market models, the commodity price
volatility is also reduced as an effect of trading (see Figure 2). According to
the model an increased trading efficiency will reduce price volatility in any
analyzed scenario parameter. We argue that this is probably related to our
choice of using statistically independent Wiener processes to characterize the
evolution of the farmers’ fitness appearing in Eq. (9).
4.2. Return on financial and farm investments
Expected speculator’s and farmer’s returns µF and µS are shown in Fig-
ure 3 as a function of the market integration parameter α. For values of
market integration α smaller than a critical value αc, the financial investor’s
expected return is negative, mainly due to the finite transaction cost cS con-
sidered in the model. We can interpret this result by observing that for
α < αc market integration does not lead to an advantage for financial in-
vestors: i.e. for α < αc the financial transaction costs cS does not allow
financial investors to extract their information rent. However, for larger val-
ues of financial integration the financial investors can exploit their superior
information (see Figure 3, top panel). We also observe that the variance of
the financial investor return σS is almost constant in α, consistently with
the neutral hypothesis for financial investors’ strategies. Notice that in the
model it exists an α∗ which maximizes the expected returns for the finan-
cial investors µS. The financial investor’s return depends on the choice of
scenario parameters, whose explicit dependence has been found in the simpli-
fied analytic model of a single farmer (described in the Appendix). Within
the simplified model its dependence on the volatility of fitness σ¯ and the
market elasticity β is shown in Figure 4 (top). It can be observed that fi-
nancial investors’ expected return µS is higher for highly risky (high value
of σ¯) and inelastic markets (low value of β). The numerical solution for µS
is also shown in Figure 4 (bottom). We observe that numerical and analytic
solutions are qualitatively in agreement in reconstructing this observable.
Farmer’s investment return µF is fairly constant and positive showing a
slight maximum in correspondence to α∗ (see bottom panel in Figure 3). In
the long run farmer investment is productive, thus in the absence of liquid-
ity constraints production is a profitable investment and, using land as a
collateral would guarantee credit availability.
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The variance of the farmers’ return σF is low in the region where α is not
far from αc, while for larger values of α it grows sharply. The variance σF is
a good indicator of the level of risk faced by a farmer in producing the real
commodity, and the model is able to reproduce the counterintuitive evidence
that the financialization amplifies the variability of returns on commodity
production.
Figure 5 quantifies the impact of the farmer’s rational production plan-
ning on investment returns µS and µF by comparing the outcome of a rational
farmer which sets the level of production taking into account the effect of
market integration level α, with the outcome of a naive farmer’s decision set-
ting production level while ignoring the effect of market integration (α = 0)
on the expectation value of γ (see Eq. (14)). The financial investor’s return
does not change significantly, while the farmer’s return µF , not surprisingly,
shows a sharp reduction of return as an effect of a suboptimal production
planning: naive farmers pay the maximum rent to financial investors which
are better informed.
Within our model financialization of trade is driven by the asymmetric
impact of market integration. On the one hand the financial investor in-
creases the investment opportunity and raises the expected return on invest-
ment, while on the other the liquidity constraint which limits the aggregate
investment capacity of the farmer implies that their return volatility grows
sharply with α. In other terms the improved efficiency of production risk
sharing exacerbates the effect of the liquidity constraints which worsen the
financing conditions of real investment and raise the default rates. This is
best understood by analyzing equilibrium production.
4.3. Equilibrium production risk and the effect of market integration on pro-
duction planning
As the degree of market integration α increases, the production quantity
(shown in Figure 6) remains fairly constant, while its volatility increases
with α. The default rate in this market is approximately 30% and almost
constant with market integration, while the default rate variance increases
with α as a combined effect of the increase in the return volatility and the
fitness fluctuation, σ¯. Note that the longer the time to produce the larger the
fluctuations in returns from real investment, thus an efficient subsidization
approach should consider a redistribution of wealth which accounts for the
differential levels of liquidity stress suffered by producers, intermediaries and
last minute-traders with differential “time to produce”.
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To better identify the relation between farmers default and production
volatility σQ, in Figure 7 we compare two different market conditions cor-
responding to different levels of exogenous parameters (details reported in
the figure caption): one characterized by a large default rate f , the other
characterized by a smaller f , in which subsidization effects are simulated by
artificially raising the level of consumers’ demand (which is equivalent to a
softening of the liquidity constraint). As can be seen the financialization ef-
fect, i.e. the relative increase in production volatility with increasing market
integration α is much larger in the market with higher default rates.
Notice that within our model the main channel of propagation of instabil-
ity induced by financialization is the lack of an efficient hedging channel able
to transfer the liquidity risk. Thus, the most dangerous fluctuations are not
price fluctuations but rather those induced by fluctuations in default rates.
A thorough analysis of the policy implications under similar assumptions
is discussed in [9], where it is suggested that subsidies are determined by the
necessity to reduce default rates to improve welfare. Within our equilibrium
solution all those conclusions continue to hold. It is however important to
point out an important distinction: in our model defaults are driven by
liquidity rather than credit risk. This is consistent with the well known
observation that in most of case subsides are given to land owners which are
well collateralized and have a reduced exposure to credit risk.
4.4. Can farmers’ hedging be effective? Some basic risk management policy
considerations
In our model farmers are not allowed to invest in the financial market and
financial investors do not invest in real production. It is important to notice,
however, that this restriction does not impose any limit in the diversification
opportunities of liquidity risk affecting production. The farmer can reduce
the default probability only by reducing the amount of capital invested in
the production of the real commodity. However, this farmer decision will not
have any consequence on aggregate sector quantities.
Assume that a representative investor is allowed to invest both in real
and financial activities by maximizing the risk return trade-off on those ac-
tivities. The asymmetric impact of market integration on the returns of real
production and financial trading would imply that the optimal allocation in
financial investment would increase with α and the investment in produc-
tion would be depleted. Changing the identity of the investors would not
modify the clearing equation (21). For this reason the global relations of
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quantity, price and farmers’ survival fraction (and their volatility) would re-
main unaffected by any farmer hedging policy. The key condition is that
the liquidity constraint applies only to real investment and generates capital
market segmentation which is not mitigated by financial hedging.
Despite our model does not address the welfare implications of the market
imperfections, it suggests that an improvement in the liquidity risk manage-
ment should be one of the main goals of optimal market regulations, tax-
ation schemes and public subsidization programs and correspondingly that
such policies should enhance liquidity risk sharing between producers, in-
termediaries and traders investing in commodity markets. Stated that the
longer is the investment horizon, in presence of large fitness uncertainty, the
larger is the liquidity risk, optimal intervention schemes could be introduced
to classify different agents according to their time to produce.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that, at least in principle, in commodity
markets dominated by uncertainty and characterized by a “time to produce”
τ , at a certain critical level of market integration a financial trader operat-
ing with a deterministic strategy can take advantage of his “on time” action
to realize a profit. Upon the introduction of a diffusive market stochastic
fitness, we demonstrate that this is the consequence of a competitive equilib-
rium generated by the asynchronous decisions of the two agents participating
in market clearing: producers are forced by their production cycle to antic-
ipate market decisions when programming their production strategy, while
financial investors can instantaneously react to current prices. In fact, the
long production cycle τ operates as a credit and liquidity risk multiplier on
farmers, which, along with liquidity constraints on production, makes the
long-term (production) investments much riskier than short-term (financial)
investments: due to the presence of liquidity constraints on long-term pro-
ducers, the integrated spot commodity and financial market is inefficient in
sharing the risk between market participants.
The model shows that more elastic markets tolerate larger values of mar-
ket integration. On the contrary negative effects of market financialization
are more pronounced on those markets characterized by long production cy-
cles and/or large market fitness volatility. Among negative effects we point
out that the combined effect of liquidity constraints and market financializa-
tion amplifies producers’ risk and production volatility. This fact may result
15
in markets which are unprotected by price turbulence if investors move sud-
denly elsewhere their financial activity towards different investment targets.
The model presented here can be developed and improved along many di-
rections: first the above model implications can be tested on real data and
an empirical analysis would certainly improve our understanding of market
imperfections, second our analysis does not take into account the relevant
sustainability issues which are generated by the complex interaction between
commodity production, food quality health programs and standards of living
of consumers. As for the first issue we note that if spot commodity and finan-
cial market integration is proxied by the relative size of short and long-term
allocations, our model predicts that for a specific commodity this quantity
should positively correlate with production volatility of that commodity.
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Appendix A. Supplementary information
Appendix A.1. The producers’ expectation γ
The model solution discussed in Section 2 depends on the determina-
tion of the farmers’ expectation γ = E0[pτθτ ], which is calculated as given
in Eq. (14) and using the price schedule pτ obtained by solving Eq. (21).
The Eq. (14) is a non-linear self consistent equation of the form γ = F (γ),
where the expectation value γ is also present in the second member through
the price schedule pτ . The Eq. (14) is solved with respect to γ using a
numerical iterative algorithm based on the secant method. The algorithm
starts from a guess γ0 and find the value that satisfy the convergence criteria
|γN − F (γN)| < 10−7, after N iterations.
At each iteration n the second member F (γn) is calculated by computing
the integral numerically using a grid of 133 points over the range of possible
θτ . Even though the distribution of θτ has an unbounded support, in practice
we truncate the distribution at four standard deviation from the mean θ0.
The number of grid points has been chosen in such a way that the integral
F (γN) does not change more than 1% between two consecutive grid points.
The integrand pnτ (θτ ) θτ is evaluated at each value of θτ on the grid and a
constant interpolation between the grid points is used for values of θτ not
on the grid. The integrand evaluation is obtained by solving numerically the
clearing equation Eq. (21) in the form:
pnτ =
(
w
Qnτ (θτ ) +QS(θτ )
) 1
β
(A.1)
where Qnτ (θτ ) is given in Eq. (13) and is a function Q(p
n
τ , θτ , γ
n), while QS is
given in Eq. (7) and is a function of θτ only. The numerical iterative algo-
rithm starts from a guess value pn,0τ and finds the equilibrium price when the
convergence criteria |pn,Mτ − pn,M−1τ | < 10−7 over M iterations is satisfied. In
practice convergence is achieved after M×N iterations, where M is typically
between 20 and 30, and N between 10 and 103 depending on the initial guess
values for γ0.
The clearing equation Eq. (21) has a single solution as demonstrated in
Section A.2 . The existence of a single solution for the expectation γ can be
analytically demonstrated in the case of a single farmer (see Section A.3).
In the more general case, we checked that the algorithm described above
converges always to the same value by starting the solution search from
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different initial guess values for γ0, distributed at random between 0 and
10000.
Appendix A.2. Existence condition for the equilibrium price
For a given realization of the fitness uncertainty θτ , the demand curve
in Eq. (21) is a monotonic decreasing function of pτ , while, due to the price
dependence of Qτ through θ
∗ (see Eq. (13)), the supply curve is monotonic
increasing in pτ . For this reason the price forms, i.e. it exists the equilibrium
solution of Eq. (21), if Qτ + QS > 0. Since Qτ is limited from above the
existence condition becomes:
γ
2
∫ ∞
0
dxNx
(
θτ , σ
2τ
)
x ≥ α (θτ − θ0) (A.2)
that also depends on the financial investor’s strategy. For α = 0 the solution
always exists. When this condition is satisfied the clearing equation always
has a single positive solution pτ .
Appendix A.3. Simplified equilibrium solution for a single farmer
In this section we provide the analytic solution of a simplified formulation
of the commodity market model described in this paper. We consider a single
farmer case. Thus, Eq. (21) becomes:
w
(pτ )
β
=
γ
2
θτ − α (θτ − θ0) (A.3)
Under the hypothesis that, in order to make his/her production decision,
the producer takes the price schedule pτ (θ) solving the clearing equation
(A.3) with α = 0:
pτ (θ) =
(
2w
γθ
) 1
β
(A.4)
the expected value γ = E0[pτθτ ] solving Eq. (14) reduces to:
γ =
∫
dθ Nθ(θ0, σ¯
2τ)
(
2w
γ
) 1
β
θ1−
1
β (A.5)
Developing the probability distribution of θτ in cumulants, Eq. (A.5) can be
solved with respect to γ and we obtain the single solution:
γ = (2w)
1
1+β θ
β−1
β+1
0
[
1− 1
2β
(1− 1
β
)x2
] β
β+1
(A.6)
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where x = σ
θ0
.
Expanding γ into a power series with center x = 0, the constant (γ0),
1st-order (γ1) and 2nd-order (γ2) approximation are respectively:
γ0 = (2w)
1
1+β θ
β−1
β+1
0 γ1 = 0γ2 = −γ0
β − 1
β(β + 1)
x2
The approximate analytic form of the financial investor’s return (Eq. (18))
is then:
µS =
Ax2 − cS
Bx− Ax2 + cS (A.7)
where:
A =
αγ0
β
− 2α
2
β
B =
αγ0√
2pi
(A.8)
and cS is the financial transaction cost.
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β w σ¯ σ θ0 cF cS
0.6 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.0002
Table 1: The chosen set of external parameters used in the model. They have been
set in order to satisfy the following requirements: the equilibrium existence con-
dition (Eq. (A.2)), the existence of a range of values for the market integration α
for which the financial investor’s expected return is positive, and the requirement
that the effect on the system induced by the presence of financial investors is not
negligible. There exist different sets of parameters satisfying those requirements,
however, as discussed in Section 3 the results are robust for different choices of
the external parameters. The value of cF is in units of the optimal investment
level m set in Eq. (5).
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Figure 1: The equilibrium price, derived from the solution of the equation (21), as a func-
tion of the difference θτ − θ0 for α = 0 (no financial and commodity markets integration)
and for a finite value of α (α = 0.4). The set of parameters that have been used is provided
in Table 1.
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Figure 2: The average equilibrium price pτ as obtained by solving Eq. (21) is shown as
a function of α. Prices are averaged over different realizations of θτ with distribution
function Nθτ (θ0, σ¯
2τ) (see Section 2.2.2). The supplied quantity Qτ (θτ ) appearing in
Eq. (21) is averaged over not defaulted farmers (see Eq. (13)). The error bars correspond
to the 1σ variation.
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Figure 3: The average returns µS (Eq. (18)) of the speculator and of the farmers µF
(Eq. (15)) are shown as a function of α. µS is averaged over different realizations of θτ
with distribution function Nθτ (θ0, σ¯
2τ) (see Section 2.2.2), while µF is also averaged over
the farmers’ population N . The error bars correspond to the 1σ variation.
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Figure 4: The financial investor’s return µS evaluated at the “optimum” α
∗ is shown
as a function of the externalities’ dispersion σ¯, and three different values of the market
elasticity β: β = 0.2 (dot dashed line), β = 0.4 (dashed line) and β = 0.6 (solid line).
On the top: results from the analytic calculation shown in Appendix A. At the bottom:
average results from the numerical calculation. Averages of µS are calculated as specified
in the caption of Figure 3.
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Figure 5: The average returns µS (Eq. (18)) of the speculator and of the farmers µF
(Eq. (15)) are shown as a function of α. Results for the rational and naive hypothesis for
the farmers are compared. Averages are calculated as specified in the caption of Figure 3.
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Figure 6: The aggregate quantity produced Qτ given in Eq. (13) and the fraction f of
farmers that default given in Eq. (17) are shown as a function of α. The fraction f and
the supplied quantity Qτ are averaged over different realizations of θτ with distribution
function Nθτ (θ0, σ¯
2τ) (see Section 2.2.2), and over not defaulted farmers (see Eq. (13)).
The error bars correspond to the 1σ variation.
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Figure 7: The variation of production volatility as a function of the market integration.
Solid line: Market A with high fraction of farmer defaults. Dashed line: Market B with low
fraction of farmer defaults. Market A is characterized by the set of parameters reported
in Table 1. The set of parameters characterizing Market B differs for a larger fitness
uncertainty σ¯ and a higher consumers level of demand (increased w). This market results
in a significantly smaller farmer defaults fraction (∼2%, to be compared to ∼30% of
defaults in Market A, see Section 3.3).
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